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1 Introduction
Consider a set of agents that has to collectively choose an alternative. Each agent
has a preference relation on the set of alternatives. We would like the chosen alter-
native to depend on the preference prole (a list of preference relations, one for each
agent). But preference relations are private information and, to be used to choose the
alternative, they have to be revealed by the agents. A social choice function collects
individual preference relations and selects an alternative for each declared preference
prole. Hence, a social choice function induces a game form that generates, at every
preference prole, a strategic problem to each agent. An agent manipulates a social
choice function if there exist a preference prole and a di¤erent preference relation for
the agent such that, if submitted, the social choice function selects a strictly better
alternative according to the preference relation of the agent of the original prefer-
ence prole. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no agent can manipulate it.
That is, the game form induced by a strategy-proof social choice function has the
property that, at every preference prole, to declare the true preference relation is a
weakly dominant strategy for all agents. Hence, each agent has an optimal strategy
(to truth-tell) independently of the agents beliefs about the other agentsdeclared
preference relations. This absence of any informational hypothesis about the oth-
erspreference relations is one of the main reasons of why strategy-proofness is an
extremely desirable property of social choice functions.
However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that nontrivial strategy-
proof social choice functions do not exist on universal domains. Strategy-proofness
is a strong requirement since a social choice function is not longer strategy-proof
as soon as there exist a preference prole and an agent that can manipulate the
social choice function by submitting another preference relation that if submitted,
the social choice function selects another alternative that is strictly preferred by the
agent. Nevertheless, there are many social choice problems where the structure of the
set of alternatives restricts the set of conceivable preference relations, and hence the
set of strategies available to agents. For instance, when the set of alternatives has a
natural order, in which all agents agree upon. The localization of a public facility, the
temperature of a room, the platform of political parties in the left-right spectrum, or
the income tax rate are all examples of such structure that imposes natural restrictions
on agentspreference relations. Black (1948) was the rst to argue that in those cases
agentspreference relations have to be single-peaked (relative to the unanimous order
on the set of alternatives). A preference relation is single-peaked if there exists a top
alternative that is strictly preferred to all other alternatives and at each of the two
sides of the top alternative the preference relation is monotonic, increasing in the left
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and decreasing in the right.
A social choice function operating only on a restricted domain of preference pro-
les may become strategy-proof. The elimination of preference proles restricts the
normal form game induced by the social choice function, and strategies (i.e., prefer-
ence relations) that were not dominant may become dominant. Consider any social
choice problem where the set of alternatives can be identied with the interval [a; b]
of real numbers and where single-peaked preference relations are dened on [a; b].
For this set up Moulin (1980) characterizes all strategy-proof and tops-only social
choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preference relations as the class of all
generalized median voter schemes.1 In addition, Moulin (1980) also characterizes the
subclass of median voter schemes as the set of all strategy-proof, tops-only and anony-
mous social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preference relations; and
this is indeed a large class of social choice functions. A median voter scheme can be
identied with a vector x = (x1; :::; xn+1) of n+1 numbers in [a; b]; where n is the car-
dinality of the set of agents N and x1  :::  xn+1. Then, for each preference prole,
the median voter scheme identied with x selects the alternative that is the median
among the n top alternatives of the agents and the n + 1 xed numbers x1; :::; xn+1:
Since 2n + 1 is an odd number, this median always exists and belongs to [a; b]: Ob-
serve that median voter schemes are tops-only and anonymous by denition. They
are strategy-proof on the domain of single-peaked preference relations because, given
a preference prole, each agent can only change the chosen alternative by moving his
declared top away from his true top; thus, no agent can manipulate a median voter
scheme at any preference prole. A median voter scheme distributes the power to
inuence the outcome among agents according to its associated vector x in an anony-
mous way. Generalized median voter schemes constitute non-anonymous extensions
of median voter schemes. A generalized median voter scheme can be identied with
a set of xed ballots fpSgSN on [a; b], one for each subset of agents S. Then, for
each preference prole, the generalized median voter scheme identied with fpSgSN
selects the alternative  that is the smallest one with the following two properties:
(i) there is a subset of agents S whose top alternatives are smaller or equal to  and
(ii) the xed ballot pS associated to S is also smaller or equal to .
Generalized median voter schemes are strategy-proof on the domain of single-
peaked preference proles, but manipulable on the universal domain. There are sev-
eral papers that have identied, in our or similar settings, maximal domains under
which social choice functions are strategy-proof but, as soon as the domain is enlarged
with a preference outside the domain, the social choice function becomes manipula-
ble. Barberà, Massó and Neme (1998), Barberà, Sonnenschein and Zhou (1992),
1A social choice function is tops-only if it only depens on the prole of top alternatives.
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Berga and Serizawa (2000), Bochet and Storcken (2009), Ching and Serizawa (1998),
Hatsumi, Berga, and Serizawa (2014), Kalai and Müller (1977), and Serizawa (1995)
are some examples of these papers. Our contribution on this paper builds upon this
literature and has the objective of giving a criterion to compare generalized median
voter schemes according to their manipulability. We want to emphasize the fact that
the manipulability of a social choice function does not indicate the degree of its lack
of strategy-proofness. There may be only one instance at which the social choice
function is manipulable or there may be many such instances. The mechanism design
literature that has focused on strategy-proofness has not distinguished between these
two situations; it has declared both social choice functions as being not strategy-proof,
dot!2
Our criterion to compare two social choice functions takes the point of view of
individual agents. We say that an agent is able to manipulate a social choice function
at a preference relation (the true one) if there exist a list of preference relations, one
for each one of the other agents, and another preference relation for the agent (the
strategic one) such that if submitted, the agent obtains a strictly better alternative
according to the true preference relation. Consider two generalized median voter
schemes, f and g; that can operate on the universal domain of preference proles.
Assume that for each agent the set of preference relations under which the agent is able
to manipulate f is contained in the set of preference relations under which the agent is
able to manipulate g: Then, from the point of view of all agents, g is more manipulable
than f: Hence, we think that f is unambiguously a better generalized median voter
scheme than g according to the strategic incentives induced to the agents. Often,
it may be reasonable to think that agentspreferences are single-peaked, but if the
designer foresees that agents may have also non single-peaked preferences, then f
may be a better choice than g if strategic incentives are relevant and important for
the designer.
Before presenting our general result in Theorem 2, we focus on median voter
schemes, the subclass of anonymous generalized median voter schemes. In Theorem
1 we provide two necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the comparability of two
median voter schemes in terms of their manipulability. Let f and g be two (non-
constant) median voter schemes and let x = (x1; :::; xn+1) and y = (y1; :::; yn+1) be
their associated vectors of xed ballots, x to f and y to g, where x1  :::  xn+1 and
y1  :::  yn+1. Then, g is at least as manipulable as f if and only if [x1; xn+1] 
[y1; yn+1] and [x2; xn]  [y2; yn]: Using this characterization we are able to establish
2Kelly (1977) is an exemption although, to compare social chocie functions according to their
manipulability, it uses a counting criteria. Pathak and Sönmez (2013) is a recent exemption and we
will refer to it later on.
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simple comparability tests for the subclass of unanimous and e¢ cient median voter
schemes. Using the partial order to be equally manipulable asobtained in Theorem
1 we show that the set of equivalence classes of median voter schemes has a complete
lattice structure with the partial order to be as manipulable as; the supremum
is the equivalence class containing all median voter schemes with x1 = x2 = a and
xn = xn+1 = b,3 and the inmum is the equivalence class with all constant median
voter schemes; i.e., for all k = 1; :::; n+ 1, xk =  for some  2 [a; b].
In Theorem 2 we provide three necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the com-
parability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their manipulability.
The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic xed
ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change
the outcome of the two generalized median voter schemes (i.e., the intervals of al-
ternatives where agents are non-dummies). Obviously, Theorem 2 is more general
than Theorem 1. However, our analysis can be sharper and deeper on the subclass of
anonymous generalized median voter schemes. In addition, Theorem 1 can be seen
as a rst step to better understand the general characterization of Theorem 2.
Before nishing this Introduction we want to relate our comparability notion with
another one recently used in centralized matching markets. Pathak and Sönmez
(2013) apply a di¤erent notion to compare the manipulability of some specic match-
ing mechanisms in school choice problems. Their notion is based on the inclusion of
preference proles at which there exists a manipulation, while our notion is based
on the inclusion of preference relations at which an agent is able to manipulate. In
applications, preference proles are not common knowledge while, in contrast, each
agent knows his preference relation (and he may only know that). To use a more ma-
nipulable generalized median voter scheme means that each agent has to worry about
his potential capacity to manipulate in a larger set. Again, the use of the inclusion of
preference relations as a basic criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes
according to their manipulability do not require any informational hypothesis. Thus,
we nd it more appealing. Moreover, we show that if two generalized median voter
schemes are comparable according to Pathak and Sönmezs notion, then they are also
comparable according to our notion. Furthermore, Example 1 shows that our notion
is indeed much weaker than Pathak and Sönmezs notion.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminary notation and
denitions. Section 3 describes the family of anonymous generalized median voter
schemes and compares them according to their manipulability. Section 4 extends the
analysis to all generalized median voter schemes. Section 5 contains a nal remark
comparing Pathak and Sönmezs criterion with ours. Sections 6 and 7 contain two
3When n is odd, this class contains the true median voter scheme.
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appendices that collect all omitted proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Agents are the elements of a nite set N = f1; :::; ng: The set of alternatives is the
interval of real numbers [a; b]  R. We assume that n  2 and a < b. Generic agents
will be denoted by i and j and generic alternatives by  and . Subsets of agents will
be represented by S and T:
The (weak) preference of each agent i 2 N on the set of alternatives [a; b] is a
complete, reexive, and transitive binary relation (a complete preorder) Ri on [a; b].
As usual, let Pi and Ii denote the strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced
by Ri, respectively; namely, for all ;  2 [a; b]; Pi if and only if :Ri, and Ii if
and only if Ri and Ri. The top of Ri is the unique alternative (Ri) 2 [a; b] that
is strictly preferred to any other alternative; i.e., (Ri)Pi for all  2 [a; b]nf(Ri)g.
Let U be the set of preferences with a unique top on [a; b]. A preference prole
R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 Un is a n-tuple of preferences. To emphasize the role of agent
i or subset of agents S, a preference prole R will be represented by (Ri; R i) or
(RS; R S), respectively.
A subset bUn  Un of preference proles (or the set bU itself) will be called a
domain. A social choice function is a function f : bUn ! [a; b] selecting an alternative
for each preference prole in the domain bUn. The range of a social choice function
f : bUn ! [a; b] is denoted by rf . That is,
rf = f 2 [a; b] j there exists R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 bUn s.t. f(R1; :::; Rn) = g:
Social choice functions require each agent to report a preference on a domain bU .
A social choice function is strategy-proof on bU if it is always in the best interest
of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully. Formally, a social choice function
f : bUn ! [a; b] is strategy-proof if for all R 2 bUn, all i 2 N , and all R0i 2 bU ,
f(Ri; R i)Rif(R0i; R i): (1)
In the sequel we will say that a social choice function f : bUn ! [a; b] is not manipulable
by i 2 N at Ri 2 U if (1) holds for all (R0i; R i) 2 bUn: To compare social choice
functions according to their manipulability, our reference set of preferences will be
the full set U .
The set of manipulable preferences of agent i 2 N for f : Un ! [a; b] is given by
Mfi = fRi 2 U j f(R0i; R i)Pif(Ri; R i) for some (R0i; R i) 2 Ung:
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Obviously, a social choice function f : Un ! [a; b] is strategy-proof if and only if
Mfi = ; for all i 2 N . We say that f : Un ! [a; b] is more manipulable than
g : Un ! [a; b] for i 2 N ifMgi (Mfi :
Now, we introduce our criterion to compare social choice functions according to
their manipulability.
Denition 1 A social function f : Un ! [a; b] is at least as manipulable as social
function g : Un ! [a; b] ifMgi Mfi for all i 2 N:
Denition 2 A social function f : Un ! [a; b] is equally manipulable as social
function g : Un ! [a; b] if f is at least as manipulable as social function g and vice
versa; i.e.,Mgi =Mfi for all i 2 N:
Denition 3 A social function f : Un ! [a; b] is more manipulable than a social
function g : Un ! [a; b] if f is at least as but not equally manipulable as social function
g; i.e.,Mgi Mfi for all i 2 N and there exists j 2 N such thatMgj  Mfj :
Given two social choice functions f : Un ! [a; b] and g : Un ! [a; b] we write (i)
f % g to denote that f is at least as manipulable as g, (ii) f  g to denote that f
is equally manipulable as g, and (iii) f  g to denote that f is more manipulable
than g: Obviously, there are many pairs of social choice functions that can not be
compared according to their manipulability.
Strategy-proofness is not the unique property we will look at. A social choice func-
tion f : bUn ! [a; b] is anonymous if it is invariant with respect to the agentsnames;
namely, for all one-to-one mappings  : N ! N and all R 2 bUn, f(R1; :::; Rn) =
f(R(1); :::; R(n)). A social choice function f : bUn ! [a; b] is dictatorial if there exists
i 2 N such that for all R 2 bUn, f(R)Ri for all  2 rf . A social choice function
f : bUn ! [a; b] is e¢ cient if for all R 2 bUn, there is no  2 [a; b] such that, for all
i 2 N , Rif(R) and Pjf(R) for some j 2 N . A social choice function f : bUn ! [a; b]
is unanimous if for all R 2 bUn such that (Ri) =  for all i 2 N , f(R) = . A social
choice function f : bUn ! [a; b] is onto if for all  2 [a; b] there is R 2 bUn such that
f(R) =  (i.e., rf = [a; b]). A social choice function f : bUn ! [a; b] is tops-only if for
all R;R0 2 bUn such that (Ri) = (R0i) for all i 2 N , f(R) = f(R0).
In our setting the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that a social choice func-
tion f : Un ! [a; b]; with #rf 6= 2; is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial
(see Barberà and Peleg (1990)). An implicit assumption is that the social choice
function operates on all preference proles on Un, because all of them are reasonable.
However, for many applications, a linear order structure on the set of alternatives
naturally induces a domain restriction in which for each preference Ri in the domain
not only there exists a unique top but also that at each of the sides of the top of Ri the
6
preference is monotonic. A well-known domain restriction is the set of single-peaked
preferences on an interval of real numbers.
Denition 4 A preference Ri 2 U is single-peaked on A  [a; b] if for all ;  2 A
such that    < (Ri) or (Ri) <   , (Ri)PiRi.
We will denote the domain of all single-peaked preferences on [a; b] by SP  U .
Moulin (1980) characterizes the family of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice
functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. This family contains many non-
dictatorial social choice functions. All of them are extensions of the median voter.
Following Moulin (1980), and before presenting the general result, we rst compare
in Section 3, the anonymous subclass according to their manipulability on the full
domain of preferences U . In Section 4 we will give a general result to compare accord-
ing to their manipulability all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on
SPn when they operate on the domain Un.
3 Anonymity: Comparing Median Voter Schemes
3.1 Median Voter Schemes
Assume rst that n is odd and let f : Un ! [a; b] be the social choice function that
selects, for each preference prole R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 Un, the median among the top
alternatives of the n agents; namely, f(R) = medf(R1); :::; (Rn)g.4 This social
choice function is anonymous, e¢ cient, tops-only, and strategy-proof on SP. Add





ballots at alternative b. Then, the median among the n top alternatives,
and the median among the n top alternatives and the n + 1 xed ballots coincide
since the n+1
2
ballots at a and the n+1
2
ballots at b cancel each other; namely, for all
R = (R1; :::; Rn) 2 Un;








g = medf(R1); :::; (Rn)g:
To proceed, and instead of adding n + 1 xed ballots at the extremes of the
interval, we can add, regardless of whether n is odd or even, n+1 xed ballots at any
of the alternatives in [a; b]. Then, a social choice function f : Un ! [a; b] is a median
4Given a set of real numbers fx1; :::; xKg, dene its median as medfx1; :::; xKg = y, where y is
such that #f1  k  K j xk  yg  K2 and #f1  k  K j xk  yg  K2 . If K is odd the median
is unique and belongs to the set fx1; :::; xKg.
7
voter scheme if there exist n + 1 xed ballots (x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]n+1 such that for
all R 2 Un,
f(R) = medf(R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1g: (2)
Hence, each median voter scheme can be identied with its vector x = (x1; :::; xn+1) 2
[a; b]n+1 of xed ballots. Moulin (1980) shows that the class of all tops-only, anony-
mous and strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked pref-
erences coincides with all median voter schemes.
Proposition 1 (Moulin, 1980) A social choice function f : SPn ! [a; b] is strategy-
proof, tops-only and anonymous if and only if f is a median voter scheme; namely,
there exist n+ 1 xed ballots (x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]n+1 such that for all R 2 SPn,
f(R) = medf(R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1g:
Median voter schemes are tops-only and anonymous by denition. To see that
they are strategy-proof, let f : SPn ! [a; b] be any median voter scheme and x
R 2 SPn and i 2 N: If f(R) = (Ri); i can not manipulate f: Assume (Ri) < f(R)
(the other case is symmetric). Agent i can only modify the chosen alternative by
declaring a preference R0i 2 SP with the property that f(R) < (R0i): But then,
either f(R) = f(R0i; R i) or f(R) < f(R
0
i; R i). Hence, (Ri) < f(R)  f(R0i; R i):
Since Ri is single-peaked, f(R)Rif(R0i; R i): Thus, i can not manipulate f: It is less
immediate to see that the set of all median voter schemes (one for each vector of n+1
xed ballots) coincides with the class of all tops-only, anonymous and strategy-proof
social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. The key point in
the proof is to identify, given a tops-only, anonymous and strategy-proof social choice
function f : SPn ! [a; b]; the vector x = (x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]n+1 of xed ballots. To
identify each xk with 1  k  n+1; consider any preference prole R 2 SPn with the
property that #fi 2 N j (Ri) = ag = n  k + 1 and #fi 2 N j (Ri) = bg = k   1
and dene xk = f(R): The proof concludes by checking that indeed f satises (2)
with this vector x = (x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]n+1 of identied xed ballots.
To see that in the statement of Proposition 1 tops-onlyness does not follow from
strategy-proofness and anonymity consider the social choice function f : SPn ! [a; b]
where for all R 2 SPn,
f(R) =
(
a if #fi 2 N j aRibg  #fi 2 N j bPiag
b otherwise.
Notice that f is strategy-proof and anonymous but it is not tops-only. It also violates
e¢ ciency, unanimity, and ontoness.
We nish this subsection with a useful remark stating that median voter schemes
are monotonic.
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Remark 1 Let f : Un ! [a; b] be a median voter scheme and let R;R0 2 Un be such
that (Ri)  (R0i) for all i 2 N: Then, f(R)  f(R0):
3.2 Main result with anonymity
Median voter schemes are strategy-proof on the domain SPn of single-peaked prefer-
ences. However, when they operate on the larger domain Un they may become manip-
ulable. Then, all median voter schemes are equivalent from the classical manipulabil-
ity point of view. In this subsection we give a simple test to compare two median voter
schemes according to their manipulability. Given a vector x = (x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]n+1
we will denote by fx its associated median voter scheme on Un; namely, for all R 2 Un,
fx(R) = medf(R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1g:
Given x = (x1; :::; xn+1)2[a; b]n+1, we will assume that x1  :::  xn+1: This can be
done without loss of generality because the social choice function associated to any
reordering of the components of x coincides with fx: Obviously, the rang of fx is
[x1; xn+1], i.e., rfx = [x1; xn+1]. Any constant social choice function, f(R) =  for all
R 2 Un; can be described as a median voter scheme by setting, for all 1  k  n+1;
xk = :We denote it by f: Trivially, any constant social choice function f is strategy
proof on Un. Then, for any  2 [a; b] and any social choice function g : Un ! [a; b]
we have that g is at least as manipulable as f (i.e., g % f). Furthermore, all
non-constant median voter schemes are manipulable on Un: Hence, any non-constant
median voter scheme fx is more manipulable than f (i.e., fx  f). Theorem
1 below gives an easy and operative way of comparing non-constant median voter
schemes according to their manipulability.
Theorem 1 Let x = (x1; :::; xn+1)2[a; b]n+1 and y = (y1; :::; yn+1)2[a; b]n+1 be two
vectors of xed ballots such that fx and f y are not constant; i.e., x1 < xn+1 and
y1 < yn+1: Then, f y is at least as manipulable as fx if and only if [x1; xn+1]  [y1; yn+1]
and [x2; xn]  [y2; yn]:
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1
In the proof of Theorem 1 the following option set will play a fundamental role.
Denition 5 Let f : Un ! [a; b] be a social choice function and let Ri 2 U . The set
of options left open by Ri 2 U is dened as follows:
of (Ri) = f 2 [a; b] j f(Ri; R i) =  for some R i 2 Un 1g:
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If fx is a median voter scheme, we denote of
x
(Ri) by ox(Ri):
Before proving Theorem 1 we state three useful lemmata, whose proofs are in
Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 Let fx : Un ! [a; b] be a median voter scheme associated with x =
(x1; :::; xn+1)2[a; b]n+1: Then, fx is not manipulable by i 2 N at Ri 2 U if and only
if Ri is single-peaked on ox(Ri) [ f(Ri); g for all  2 rfx.
Lemma 2 Let fx : Un ! [a; b] be a median voter scheme associated with x =
(x1; :::; xn+1)2[a; b]n+1: Then,
ox(Ri) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[x1; xn] if a  (Ri) < x1
[(Ri); xn] if x1  (Ri) < x2
[x2; xn] if x2  (Ri)  xn
[x2; (Ri)] if xn < (Ri)  xn+1
[x2; xn+1] if xn+1 < (Ri)  b:
Lemma 3 Let fx : Un ! [a; b] and f y : Un ! [a; b] be two median voter schemes
associated with x = (x1; :::; xn+1)2[a; b]n+1 and y = (y1; :::; yn+1) 2 [a; b]n+1 such that
[x1; xn+1]  [y1; yn+1] and [x2; xn]  [y2; yn]: Then, ox(Ri)  oy(Ri) for all Ri 2 U .
Lemma 1 plays a key role in the proof of Theorem 1. To understand it notice that
it roughly says that whether or not agent i can manipulate fx at Ri depends on the
fact that Ri should only be like single-peaked on the set of alternatives that may be
selected by fx for some subprole R i; given Ri: The comparison, in terms of Ri, of
pairs of alternatives that will never be selected once Ri is submitted, is irrelevant in
terms of agent is power to manipulate fx: To illustrate that, consider the case where
n = 3; x1 = a, x2 = a+b3 , x3 =
2(a+b)
3
and x4 = b: Then, rfx = [a; b]: Let Ri 2 U















Lemma 1 says that Ri should be single-peaked on this interval and that the preference
away from (Ri) towards the direction of a+b3 has to be monotonically decreasing until
alternative a+b
3
and that all alternatives further away have to be worse than a+b
3
but
they can be freely ordered among themselves; and symmetrically from (Ri) towards
the direction of 2(a+b)
3
. Figure 1 illustrates a preference that is single-peaked on
ox(Ri) [ f(Ri); g for all  2 rfx : It also shows that this set may be signicantly





































































Proof of Theorem 1 First, we will prove that if [x1; xn+1]  [y1; yn+1] and
[x2; xn]  [y2; yn]; then f y is at least as manipulable as fx: Suppose that Ri 2 Mfxi :
By Lemma 1, there exists  2 rfx such that Ri is not single-peaked on ox(Ri) [
f(Ri); g: By Lemma 3, ox(Ri)  oy(Ri): Since rfx = [x1; xn+1]  [y1; yn+1] = rfy ;
we have that  2 rfy : Hence, Ri is not single-peaked on oy(Ri) [ f(Ri); g; where
 2 Rfy . Thus; by Lemma 1, Ri 2Mfyi : Therefore, f y is at least as manipulable as
fx:




i for all i 2 N: (3)
To obtain a contradiction assume that [x1; xn+1] * [y1; yn+1] or [x2; xn] * [y2; yn]: We
will divide the proof between two cases.
Case 1: [x1; xn+1] * [y1; yn+1]: In particular, suppose that x1 < y1; the proof for
the case yn+1 < xn+1 proceeds similarly and therefore it is omitted. We will divide
the proof between two cases again, depending on whether x1 < x2 or x1 = x2.
Case 1.1: x1 < x2: Let ; ;  2 [a; b] be such that x1 <  <  <  < minfx2; y1g
and let Ri 2 U be such that:
i) (Ri) = ,
ii) Pi and
iii) if ;  2 [a; b] and y1 <  < ; then Ri:
Since x1 < (Ri) < x2 and x1 < (Ri) < y1, by Lemma 2,
ox(Ri) = [(Ri); xn] and oy(Ri) = [y1; yn]:
Hence, and since (Ri); ;  2 ox(Ri) and ii) holds, Ri is not single-peaked on ox(Pi)
and, for all 0 2 rfy , Ri is single-peaked on oy(Ri) [ f(Ri)g [ f0g because rfy =
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[y1; yn+1]. Thus, by Lemma 1, Ri 2Mfxi nMf
y
i which contradicts (3).
Case 1.2: x1 = x2: Since fx is not constant and x1 < y1, x1 < minfy1; xn+1g: Let
; ;  2 [a; b] be such that x1 <  <  <  < minfy1; xn+1g and let Ri 2 U be such
that:
i) (Ri) = ,
ii) Pi and
iii) if ;  2 [a; b] and y1 <  < ; then Pi:
Since x1 < (Ri) < y1 and x1 = x2 < (Ri); by Lemma 2,
ox(Ri) =
(
[x2; xn] if x2  (Ri)  xn
[x2; (Ri)] if xn < (Ri)  xn+1
and oy(Ri) = [y1; yn]:
Hence, and since ; ; (Ri) 2 ox(Ri) and ii) holds, Ri is not single-peaked on ox(Ri)
and, for all 0 2 rfy ; Ri is single-peaked on oy(Ri) [ f(Ri)g [ f0g because rfy =
[y1; yn+1]. Thus, by Lemma 1, Ri 2Mfxi nMf
y
i which contradicts (3).
Case 2: [x2; xn] * [y2; yn] and [x1; xn+1]  [y1; yn+1]: In particular, suppose that
x2 < y2; the proof for the case yn < xn proceeds similarly and therefore it is omitted.






iii) if ;  2 [a; b] and (Ri) <  < ; then Pi:
Since y1  x1  x2 < (Ri) < y2; by Lemma 2,
ox(Ri) =
8><>:
[x2; xn] if x2  (Ri)  xn
[x2; (Ri)] if xn < (Ri)  xn+1
[x2; xn+1] if (Ri) > xn+1
and oy(Ri) = [(Ri); yn]:
Hence, and since ; ; (Ri) 2 ox(Ri) and ii) holds, Ri is not single-peaked on ox(Ri)
and, for all 0 2 rfy ; Ri is single-peaked on oy(Ri) [ f(Ri); 0g. Thus, by Lemma 1,
Ri 2Mfxi nMf
y
i which contradicts (3). 
For further reference, let MV S denote the set of all median voting schemes from
Un to [a; b]: An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is that if median voter scheme f
is at least as manipulable as median voter scheme g, then the range of g is contained
in the range of f: The improvement in terms of the strategy-proofness of median
voter schemes necessarily requires the corresponding reduction of their ranges since
smaller ranges reduce agentspower to manipulate. The corollary below, that follows
from Theorem 1 and the fact that for all fx 2 MV S; rfx = [x1; xn+1], states this
observation formally.
Corollary 1 Let f; g 2MV S. If f % g, then rg  rf .
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Consider a problem where the range of the social choice has to be xed a priori
to be a subinterval [c; d]  [a; b]: Let MV S[c;d] be the set of all median voter schemes
with range [c; d] (i.e., fx 2 MV S[c;d] if and only if x1 = c and xn+1 = d). Theorem 1
gives criteria to compare the elements in MV S[c;d]:
Corollary 2 Let f y; fx 2MV S[c;d]:
a) Then, f y % fx if and only if [x2; xn]  [y2; yn]:
b) If y2 = yn; then there does not exist g 2MV S[c;d] such that f y  g.
Statement b) identies the median voter schemes in MV S[c;d] that do not admit
a less manipulable median voter scheme in MV S[c;d]:
3.4 Unanimity
According to Proposition 1 in Moulin (1980), a median voter scheme fx : SPn !
[a; b] is e¢ cient (on the single-peaked domain) if and only if x1 = a and xn+1 = b;
namely, fx can be described as the median of the n top alternatives submitted by
the agents and only n   1 xed ballots since x1 = a and xn+1 = b cancel each other
in (2). But this subclass of median voter schemes is appealing because it coincides
with the class of all unanimous median voter schemes (MV S[a;b] using the notation
introduced in the previous subsection).5 Corollary bellow shows that Theorem 1
has clear implications on how unanimous and non-unanimous median voter schemes
can be ordered according to their manipulability. In particular, given a unanimous
median voter scheme there is always a non-unanimous median voter scheme that
is less manipulable. Moreover, if a unanimous median voter scheme and a non-
unanimous median voter scheme are comparable according to their manipulability,
then the former is more manipulable than the later.
Corollary 3 Let f y 2MV S be unanimous.
a) Then, for all fx 2MV S; f y % fx if and only if [x2; xn]  [y2; yn].
b) There exists a non-constant and non-unanimous fx 2MV S such that f y  fx.
c) Let fx 2MV S be non-unanimous and assume fx and f y are comparable according
to their manipulability. Then, f y  fx:
Proof Let f y 2MV S be unanimous. Hence, y1 = a and yn+1 = b:
a) The statement follows immediately from Theorem 1.
5Observe that when unanimous median voter schemes operate on the full domain Un they are not
anymore e¢ cient. In the next subsection we will provide some simple criteria to compare e¢ cient
median voter schemes on the full domain Un according to their manipulability.
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b) We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 : Assume y2 < yn and let ; ;  2 [a; b] be such that y2 <  <  <  < yn:
Consider x = (; ; :::; ; ) 2 [a; b]n+1: Then, [x2; xn] = fg  [y2; yn]: By Theorem
1, f y is at least as manipulable as fx and since [y2; yn] * [x2; xn], fx is not at least as
manipulable as f y: Hence, f y is more manipulable than fx and fx is neither constant
nor unanimous since a < x1 < xn+1 < b:
Case 2: Assume y2 = yn. Furthermore, suppose that a < y2; the proof when
yn < b proceeds symmetrically and therefore it is omitted. Let  2 (a; y2) and
consider x = (; y2; :::; y2; b) 2 [a; b]n+1: Then, [x2; xn] = fy2g. By Theorem 1, f y is
at least as manipulable as fx and, since [y1; yn+1] = [a; b] * [x1; xn+1], fx is not at
least as manipulable as f y: Hence, f y is more manipulable than fx. Furthermore,
and since a < x1 = ::: = xn < xn+1 = b, fx is neither constant nor unanimous:
c) Assume fx 2 MV S is not unanimous. Then, [x1; xn+1] ( [y1; yn+1] = [a; b]: By
Theorem 1, fx is not at least as manipulable as f y: Furthermore, as fx and f y are
comparable, f y  fx must hold. 
We conclude this subsection with a corollary that identies the unanimous median
voter schemes that do not admit a less manipulable unanimous median voter scheme.
The statement also follows immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 4 Let f y be a unanimous median voter scheme such that y2 = yn: Then,
there does not exist an unanimous median voting scheme g such that f y  g.
3.5 E¢ ciency
A median voter scheme fx : Un ! [a; b] (operating on the full domain of preferences)
is e¢ cient if and only if x1 = a, xn+1 = b and xk 2 fa; bg for all 2  k  n.6 This
is because on the larger domain, if a median voter scheme fx has an interior xed
ballot xk 2 (a; b) it is always possible to nd a preference prole R with fx(R) = xk
such that there exists an alternative y that is unanimously strictly preferred by all
agents; namely, yPifx(R) for all i 2 N: Moreover, all e¢ cient median voter schemes
are unanimous.
We now present simple criteria that are useful to compare e¢ cient median voter
schemes with other unanimous median voter schemes according to their manipulabil-
ity. But before, we need a bit of additional notation.
6Hence, an e¢ cient median voter scheme fx : Un ! [a; b] has the property that for all
(R1; :::; Rn) 2 Un;
fx(R1; :::; Rn) 2 f(R1); :::; (Rn)g:
Miyagawa (1998) and Heo (2013) have studied this property under the name of peak-selection.
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Let k be an integer such that 1  k  n and (1; :::; n) 2 [a; b]n: Denote
by k(1; :::; n) the k-th ranked number; namely, #fi 2 f1; :::; ng j i 
k(1; :::; n)g  n   k + 1 and #fi 2 f1; :::; ng j i  k(1; :::; n)g  k:
In particular, for k = 1 and k = n,
1(1; :::; n) = maxf1; :::; ng
n(1; :::; n) = minf1; :::; ng:
Let fx : Un ! [a; b] be an e¢ cient median voter scheme. Then, x = (a; :::; a| {z }
k
; b; :::; b| {z })
n+1 k
for some 1  k  n and, for all R 2 Un;
fx(R1; :::; Rn) = 
k((R1); :::; (Rn)):
We denote the e¢ cient median voter scheme fx with k xed ballots at a by fk:
Corollary 5 Let fk : Un ! [a; b] be an e¢ cient median voter scheme such that
k =2 f1; ng: Then, the following hold.
a) For any fx 2MV S; fk % fx:
b) If 1 < k0 < n; then fk  fk0.
c) fk  f 1 and fk  fn:
d) If fx is non-unanimous, then fk  fx:
e) There exists a non-e¢ cient and unanimous fx 2MV S such that fk  fx.
Corollary 5 says the following. Statement a) states that any e¢ cient median voter
scheme f =2 ff 1; fng belongs to the set of the most manipulable median voter schemes.
Statement c) states that the two e¢ cient median voter schemes f 1 and fn are less
manipulable than any other e¢ cient median voter scheme f =2 ff 1; fng: Statement
d) states that any non-unanimous median voter scheme is less manipulable that any
e¢ cient median voter scheme f =2 ff 1; fng: Statement e) states that given an e¢ cient
median voter scheme f =2 ff 1; fng there is always a (non-e¢ cient) unanimous median
voter scheme that is less manipulable. Moreover, Corollary 5 has the following two
implications when n is odd. First, for any fx 2MV S; f n+12 % fx, and second, for all
non-unanimous fx 2MV S; f n+12  fx:
Proof Let y be the vector of xed ballots associated to fk: Since k =2 f1; ng;
y1 = y2 = a and yn = yn+1 = b: (4)
a) It follows from (4) and Theorem 1.
b) It follows from a).
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c) Let z be the vector of xed ballots associated to f 1; namely, z1 = a and z2 = ::: =
zn+1 = b: Hence, by (4) and Theorem 1, fk is more manipulable than f 1: Using a
similar argument, it also follows that fk  fn.
d) Let fx be a non-unanimous median voter scheme. Then, either a < x1 or xn+1 < b:
Hence, by (4) and Theorem 1, fk is more manipulable than fx
e) Consider any  2 (a; b) and dene x = (a; ; :::; | {z }
k 1-times
; b; :::; b): Then, fx is unanimous
but it is not e¢ cient. By (4) and Theorem 1, fk  fx: 
Corollary 6 Let f 2MV S be e¢ cient and such that either f = f 1 or f = fn.
a) Then, there exists a non-e¢ cient and non-constant fx 2MV S such that f  fx.
b) If fx and f are comparable and fx is non-e¢ cient, then f  fx:
Corollary 6 says the following. Statement a) states that there exists a non-e¢ cient
and non-constant median voter scheme that is less manipulable than f 1 (or fn).
Statement b) says that if the e¢ cient median voter scheme f 1 (or fn) and a non-
e¢ cient median voter scheme f are comparable according to their manipulability,
then the former is more manipulable than the later. Corollaries 5 and 6 make clear
the well-known trade-o¤ between strategy-proofness and e¢ ciency.
Proof Consider f 1 2MV S and let y = (a; b; :::; b) be its associated vector of xed
ballots. The case fn 2MV S proceeds symmetrically.
a) Dene x = (a; ; b; :::; b); where  2 (a; b): Then, by Theorem 1, f 1  fx and it is
clear that fx is non-e¢ cient:
b) Since [y2; yn] = fbg; and fx and f 1 are comparable, Theorem 1 implies that f 1  fx:

3.6 Complete lattice structure
Using Theorem 1 we can partition the set of median voter schemesMV S into equiva-
lence classes in such a way that each equivalence class contains median voter schemes
that are all equally manipulable. Denote the (cocient) set of those equivalence classes
byMV S= . Furthermore, we can extend % onMV S to the set of equivalence classes
MV S=  in a natural way. Denote this extension by [%]: In this subsection we will
show that the pair (MV S= ; [%]) is a complete lattice; namely, any nonempty subset
of equivalence classes in MV S=  has a supremum and an inmum according to [%]:
Formally, given fx 2 MV S; denote by [fx] the equivalence class of fx with respect
to ; i.e.,
[fx] = fg 2MV S j g  fxg:
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Let [c] be the class of all constant median voter schemes.7 Assume that [fx] 6= [c].
By Theorem 1, [fx] can be identied with the four-tuple (x1; x2; xn; xn+1):
Denote by MV S=  the set of all equivalence classes induced by  on MV S
and consider the binary relation [%] on MV S=  dened as follows. For any pair
[fx]; [f y] 2MV S= ; set
[fx][%][f y] if and only if fx % f y:
Since % is a preorder on MV S; it follows that [%] is a partial order on MV S=  :
Furthermore, by Theorem 1, if [fx] 6= [c] and [f y] 6= [c]; then
[fx][%][f y] if and only if x1  y1; x2  y2; xn  yn and xn+1  yn+1:
We can now state and prove the result of this subsection.
Proposition 2 The pair (MV S= ; [%]) is a complete lattice.

































xn+1) if [c] =2 Z
[c] if [c] 2 Z:



















k 2 [a; b]
for all k = 1; 2; n; n + 1: Consider the equivalence classes [fSZ ] and [f IZ ] associated














n+1); respectively. That is, f
y 2 [fSZ ] if
and only if yk = xSZk for k = 1; 2; n; n + 1 and f
y 2 [f IZ ] if and only if yk = xIZk for
k = 1; 2; n; n+ 1: Since xSZk ; x
IZ
k 2 [a; b] for all k = 1; 2; n; n+ 1; we have that
[fSZ ]; [f IZ ] 2MV S=  : (5)
Moreover, if Z =MV S=  then [fSZ ] = (a; a; b; b) and [f IZ ] = [c]:
Now we show that (MV S= ; [%]) is a complete lattice. Let ; 6= Z  MV S=  :
By (5), [fSZ ]; [f IZ ] 2MV S= . By Theorem 1 and the denition of [fSZ ] and [f IZ ],
lub Z = [fSZ ] and llb Z = [f IZ ] are, respectively, the least upper bound and the
7Remember that all constant median voter schemes (excluded in the statement of Theorem 1)
are equally manipulable since all of them are strategy-proof on Un.
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largest lower bound with respect to [%]. Hence, sup[%] Z = [fSZ ] and inf [%] Z = [f IZ ]:
Thus, (MV S= ; [%]) is a complete lattice. 
Two immediate consequences follow from the proof of Proposition 2. First, and
since [c] is the smallest equivalence class in MV S=  according to [%], all constant
median voter schemes are less manipulable than any other non-constant median voter
scheme (i.e., [c] = inf [%]MSV= ). Second, and since the equivalence class containing
all median voter schemes identied with the four-tuple (a; a; b; b) is the largest equiva-
lence inMV S=  according to [%] (i.e., this equivalence class is the sup[%]MSV= ),
any median voter scheme fx such that x1 = x2 = a and xn = xn+1 = b is more
manipulable than any otherMV S outside this class. Observe that this class includes
all e¢ cient median voting schemes except f 1 and fn.
Finally, if n  3 and fx 2 MV S is non-constant, then [fx] = ffxg: Thus, the
pair (MV S;%) is like a complete lattice (it is not because the equivalence class of
constant median voter schemes is not degenerated).
Figure 2 summarizes the complete lattice structure of the pair (MV S= ; [%]) for
any n  2; whose properties have been collected along Corollaries 3, 4, 5, and 6.
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rf = [a; b]
x2 = xn  ! "[%]
Figure 2
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4 Comparing All GeneralizedMedian Voter Schemes
4.1 Generalized Median Voter Schemes
Median voter schemes are anonymous. All agents have the same power to inuence
the outcome of a given median voter scheme fx; although this power depends on
the distribution of its associated xed ballots x = (x1; :::; xn+1): Generalized median
voter schemes admit the possibility that di¤erent agents may have di¤erent power to
inuence its outcome. This power will be described by a monotonic family of xed
ballots, one for each coalition (subset) of agents. To develop a useful intuition to
understand the class of all generalized median voter schemes, consider rst the case
n = 2: Given a monotonic family of xed ballots fpf1;2g; pf1g; pf2g; pf;gg, one for each
coalition of agents, such that a  pf1;2g  pf1g  pf2g  pf;g  b, we dene the social
choice function f : U2 ! [a; b] as follows: for each R 2 U2;
f(R) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
pf1;2g if (R1); (R2)  pf1;2g
(R2) if (R1)  pf1;2g  (R2)  pf1g
pf1g if (R1)  pf1;2g  pf1g  (R2)
medf(R1); (R2); pf1gg if pf1;2g  (R1)  pf1g
(R1) if pf1g  (R1)  pf2g
medf(R1); (R2); pf2gg if pf2g  (R1)  pf;g
pf2g if pf;g  (R1) and (R2)  pf2g
(R2) if pf2g  (R2)  pf;g  (R1)
pf;g if pf;g  (R1); (R2):
Observe that rf = [pf1;2g; pf;g]: We can interpret this function as a way of assigning
to agents 1 and 2 the power to select the alternative in the subset rf = [pf1;2g; pf;g]:
For instance, agent 1 can make sure that the outcome is at most pf1g by voting below
pf1g and at most (R1) by voting above pf1g and agent 1 is a dictator on [pf1g; pf2g]







To present the characterization of all strategy-proof and tops-only social choice
functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences for all n  2, we say that a
collection fpSgS22N is a monotonic family of xed ballots if (i) pS 2 [a; b] for all
S 2 2N and (ii) T  Q implies pQ  pT . The characterization is the following.
Proposition 3 (Moulin, 1980) A social choice function f : SPn ! [a; b] is strategy-
proof and tops-only if and only if there exists a monotonic family of xed ballots
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The social choice functions identied in Proposition 3 are called generalized median
voter schemes. A simple way of interpreting them is as follows. Each generalized
median voting scheme (and its associated monotonic family of xed ballots) can be
understood as a particular way of distributing the power among coalitions to inuence
the social choice. To see that, take an arbitrary coalition S and its xed ballot pS.
Then, coalition S can make sure that, by all of its members reporting a top alternative
below pS, the social choice will be at most pS, independently of the reported top
alternatives of the members of the complementary coalition.8 An alternative way of
describing this distribution of power among coalitions is as follows. Fix a monotonic
family of xed ballots fpSgS22N (i.e., a generalized median voter scheme) and take a
vector of tops ((R1); :::; (Rn)): Start at the left extreme of the interval a and push
the outcome to the right until it reaches an alternative  for which the following two
things happen simultaneously: (i) there exists a coalition of agents S such that all
its members have reported a top alternative below or equal to  (i.e., (Ri)  
for all i 2 S) and (ii) the xed ballot pS associated to S is located also below 
(i.e., pS  ). Median voter schemes are the anonymous subclass of generalized
median voter schemes. Hence, the xed ballots of any two coalitions with the same
cardinality of any anonymous generalized median voter scheme are equal. From a
monotonic family of xed ballots fpSgS22N associated to an anonymous generalized
median voter scheme f : Un ! [a; b] we can identify the n+ 1 ballots x1  :::  xn+1
needed to describe f as a median voter scheme as follows: for each 1  k  n + 1,
xk = pS for all S 2 2N such that #S = n   k + 1. Moreover, the onto social choice
function f : Un ! [a; b] where agent j 2 N is the dictator (i.e., for all R 2 Un,
f(R) = (Rj)) can be described as a generalized median voter scheme by setting
pT = a for all T  N such that j 2 T and pS = b for all S  N such that j =2 S:
Then, for any R 2 Un, (i) maxf(Rj); pfjgg = (Rj); (Rj)  maxi2Tf(Ri); pTg for
any T  N such that j 2 T ; and (iii) maxi2Sf(Ri); pSg = b for any S  N such
that j =2 S: Thus, minS022N maxi02S0f(Ri0); pS0g = (Rj):
Given a monotonic family of xed ballots p = fpSgSN ; let fp denote the gener-
alized median voter scheme associated to p:




Our main result will provide a systematic way of comparing non-constant and non-
dictatorial generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. It
turns out that to perform this comparison it is crucial to identify, for each agent
i 2 N , the subintervals where i is a non-dummy agent; i.e., the subset of alternatives
that are eventually chosen at some prole but agent i is able to change the chosen
alternative by reporting a di¤erent preference relation. We dene formally below the
general notion of a non-dummy agent at an alternative in a social choice function.
Denition 6 Let f : Un ! [a; b] be a social choice function. Agent i is non-dummy
at  2 [a; b] in f if there exists R 2 Un and R0i 2 U such that
f(Ri; R i) =  and
f(R0i; R i) 6= .
The lemma below characterizes non-dummyness at an alternative in a generalized
median voter scheme fp : Un ! [a; b] in terms of the monotonic family of xed ballots
p: This characterization will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 4 Let fp : Un ! [a; b] be a generalized median voter scheme. Then, i is
non-dummy at  in fp if and only if there exists S  N such that i 2 S, pS < pSnfig
and pS    pSnfig:
Proof See Appendix 2 at the end of the paper.
The set of all  2 [a; b] such that i is non-dummy at  in fp : Un ! [a; b] is
denoted by NDip. By Lemma 4,
NDip =
S
fSN ji2S and pS<pSnfigg
[pS; pSnfig]: (6)
We are now ready to state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 2 Let p = fpSgSN and p = fpSgSN be two monotonic families of xed
ballots and assume that the two associated generalized median voter schemes fp :
Un ! [a; b] and f p : Un ! [a; b] are neither constant nor dictatorial. Then,
[pN ; pfig] \NDip  [pN ; pfig] \NDip; (7)
[pNnfig; pf;g] \NDip  [pNnfig; pf;g] \NDip; (8)
and
[pfig; pNnfig]  NDip (9)
hold for all i 2 N if and only if f p is at least as manipulable as fp:
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Before presenting three lemmata used in the proof of Theorem 2 few remarks are
in order.
First, conditions (7), (8), and (9) say that the relevant information to compare two
generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability for agent i 2 N
lies in the values of the xed ballots associated to coalitions N; Nnfig, fig and f;g
and in is non-dummy sets.
Second, observe that condition (9) is only relevant when pfig < pNnfig because if
pNnfig < pfig; then [pfig; pNnfig] = ; and if pNnfig = pfig; then (9) follows from (7) and
(8) since fp is not constant and pNnfig = pfig 2 NDip.
Third, if the non constant generalized median voter schemes associated to the
monotonic families of xed ballots p = fpSgS22N and p = fpSgSN are anonymous,
then NDip = [pN ; pf;g]; ND
i
p = [pN ; pf;g] (i is non-dummy in the full ranges of f
p and
f p); pNnfig  pfig and pNnfig  pfig for all i 2 N: Therefore, conditions (7), (8), and
(9) are equivalent to
[pN ; pfig]  [pN ; pfig]
and
[pNnfig; pf;g]  [pNnfig; pf;g]
or
[pN ; pf;g]  [pN ; pf;g]
and
[pNnfig; pfig]  [pNnfig; pfig]:
Now, if x and y are the n + 1 vectors associated to fp and f p, respectively, then
x1 = pN ; x2 = pNnfig; xn = pfig; xn+1 = pf;g, y1 = pN ; y2 = pNnfig; yn = pfig and
yn+1 = pf;g: Thus, conditions (7), (8), and (9) are equivalent to
[x1; xn+1]  [y1; yn+1]
and
[x2; xn]  [y2; yn];
which is what Theorem 1 says. Hence, Theorem 1 can be seen as a corollary of
Theorem 2.
We will say that an interval Ii = [c; d] with c < d is a non-dummy interval for
i in fp if Ii  NDip: Whenever we refer to an interval as a non-dummy interval we
exclude the possibility that the interval contains only one alternative. If i 2 S with
pS < pSnfig; then [pS; pSnfig] is a non-dummy interval for i in fp and we denote it by
ISi :We will write I
S




We state now the three lemmata, whose proofs are in Appendix 2, that will be




Lemma 5 Let fp : Un ! [a; b] be a non-constant generalized median voter scheme:
Then, fp is not manipulable by i at Ri if and only if, for all ISi ; Ri is single-peaked
on (op(Ri) \ ISi ) [ f(Ri); g for all  2 ISi .
Lemma 6 Let p = fpSgSN be a monotonic family of xed ballots and Ri 2 U .
If pfig < pNnfig, then
op(Ri) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pfig
f(Ri)g if pfig < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pf;g
[pNnfig; pf;g] if pf;g < (Ri):
If pNnfig  pfig; then
op(Ri) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; pfig] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pfig < (Ri)  pf;g
[pNnfig; pf;g] if pf;g < (Ri):
Lemma 7 Let p = fpSgSN and p = fpSgSN be two monotonic families of xed
ballots such that fp and f p are not constant. Assume (7), (8), and (9) in Theorem
2 hold. Then, for any non-dummy interval ISi and for all 
 2 ISi there exists a non
dummy interval I^i for i in f p such that  2 I^i and (op(Ri) \ ISi )  (op(Ri) \ I^i) for
all Ri 2 U .9
Denition 7 Let f : Un ! [a; b] be a social choice function. Agent i is a dictator at
 2 [a; b] in f if for all Ri 2 U such that (Ri) = ,
f(Ri; R i) =  for all R i 2 Un 1:
Let fp : Un ! [a; b] be a generalized median voter scheme and i 2 N be an
agent. Denote the set of all  2 [a; b] such that i is a dictator at  in fp; by DT ip:
By Lemma 6, DT ip = [pfig; pNnfig]: Observe that if pNnfig < pfig; then i is not a
dictator at any  2 [a; b] in fp: Furthermore, if pfig < pNnfig; then, by monotonicity,
pNnfjg  pfig < pNnfig  pfjg for all j 6= i: Therefore, if pfig < pNnfig; then j is not a
dictator at any  2 [a; b] in fp for all j 6= i:
9Note that I^i does not have to be necessarily written as IS
0
i for some S
0 3 i:
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Denition 8 Let p = fpSgSN and p = fpSgSN be two monotonic families of xed
ballots. The generalized median voter scheme fp : Un ! [a; b] is at least more (or
more) dictatorial for i than the generalized median voter scheme f p : Un ! [a; b] if
; 6= DT ip  DT ip (or ; 6= DT ip $ DT ip).
Proposition below formalizes the trade-o¤ between dictatorialness and manipula-
bility.
Proposition 4 Let p = fpSgSN and p = fpSgSN be two monotonic families of xed
ballots. Assume that fp : Un ! [a; b] and f p : Un ! [a; b] are non-constant, non-
dictatorial and comparable according to their manipulability. If fp is more dictatorial
for i than f p, then f p is more manipulable than fp.
Proof Since fp is more dictatorial than f p for i; ; 6= DT ip $ DT ip: Then, [pfig; pNnfig] $
[pfig; pNnfig] and pfig  pNnfig: Therefore, pfig < pfig and pNnfig  pNnfig or pfig  pfig
and pNnfig < pNnfig: Assume that pfig < pfig and pNnfig  pNnfig hold; the proof for
the other case proceeds similarly and therefore it is omitted. Since DT ip 6= ; and
p = fpSgSN is monotonic, NDip = [pN ; pf;g] holds by (6). Thus,
[pN ; pfig] \NDip = [pN ; pfig]:
Similarly, and since DT ip 6= ;,
[pN ; pfig] \NDip = [pN ; pfig]:
Since fp and f p are comparable according to their manipulability and pfig < pfig;
[pN ; pfig] \NDip = [pN ; pfig] $ [pN ; pfig] = [pN ; pfig] \NDip:
Thus, by Theorem 2, f p is more manipulable than fp: 
5 Final remark
Before moving to the omitted proofs we nish with a nal remark relating our com-
parability notion with the one proposed by Pathak and Sönmez. Pathak and Sönmez
(2013) propose an inclusion criterion to compare two social choice functions accord-
ing to their manipulability. In general, the social choice function  is at least as
manipulable as the social choice function ' according to Pathak and Sönmez if '
is manipulable at prole R, then  is also manipulable at prole R. Proposition 5
shows that in our setting Pathak and Sönmez criterion is weaker than ours.
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Proposition 5 Let f and g be two generalized median voter schemes and assume
that g is at least as manipulable as f according to Pathak and Sönmezs notion. Then,
g is at least as manipulable as f:
Proof Assume that g is at least as manipulable as f according to Pathak and
Sönmezs notion. Fix i 2 N and let Ri 2Mfi : There exists (R0i; R i) 2 Un such that
f(R0i; R i)Pif(Ri; R i): (10)
Since f is tops-only, we may assume that R i 2 SPn 1: By (10), f is manipulable at
prole R: Hence, by assumption, g is manipulable at prole R: Since R i 2 SPn 1,
by Lemma 5, agent i manipulates g at prole R: Hence, Ri 2Mgi : Thus, g is at least
as manipulable as f: 
Example 1 below shows that the reverse implication does not hold; that is, Pathak
and Sönmezs notion is strictly weaker than ours and leaves many pairs of generalized
median voter schemes as being non-comparable while they are according to our notion.
Example 1 Let n = 3 and fx and f y be two median voter schemes associated to




; 1) and y = (0; 0; 1; 1); respectively. By Theorem 1, and since [x1; xn+1] 
[y1; yn+1] and [x2; xn]  [y2; yn], f y is more manipulable that fx: In one hand, consider
any prole R = (R1; R2; R3) 2 U3 and any preference R03 2 U such that (i) (Ri) = 1






; and (iii) (R03) =
3
4






= fx(R) and hence, fx is manipulable at prole R. Moreover, f y(R) = 1
and f y is not manipulable at prole R: Hence, f y is not more manipulable than fx
according to Pathak and Sönmezs notion. On the other hand, consider any prolebR = ( bR1; bR2; bR3) 2 U3 and any preference bR03 2 U such that (i) ( bR1) = 12 ; (ii)
( bR2) = 14 ; (iii) ( bR3) = 34 and 14 bR3 12 ; and (iv) ( bR03) = 14 : Therefore, fx( bR) = 12 and fx
is not manipulable at prole bR:Moreover, f y( bR1; bR2; bR03) = 14 bR3 12 = f y( bR) and hence,
f y is manipulable at prole bR: Hence, fx is not more manipulable than f y according
to Pathak and Sönmezs notion. Thus, fx and f y are not comparable according to
Pathak and Sönmezs notion of manipulability, although they are according to our
notion. 
Example 1 illustrates the fact that our comparability notion is based on the inclu-
sion of the maximal domains of preferences under which each of the two generalized
median voter schemes are strategy-proof. In this case, the maximal domain of prefer-
ences under which f y is strategy-proof is the set of single-peaked preferences on [0; 1]
while fx admits a much larger maximal domain, the union of the following three sets:
fRi 2 U j 0  (Ri) < 12 , (Ri) <  <   12 ) Ri, and 12 < ) 12Rig;
fRi 2 U j 12 < (Ri)  1, 12   <  < (Ri)) Ri, and  < 12 ) 12Rig; and
fRi 2 U j (Ri) = 12g:
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6 Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1
)) Suppose there exists  2 rfx such that Ri is not single-peaked on ox(Ri) [
f(Ri); g: We will prove that there exist R0i 2 U and R i 2 Un 1 such that
fx(R0i; R i)Pif
x(Ri; R i). We will divide the proof into three di¤erent cases.
Case 1: Suppose  2 ox(Ri) and there exists  2 ox(Ri) such that  <  <
(Ri) and Pi; the other case where (Ri) <  <  and Pi is similar and
therefore it is omitted. Let R^ 2 Un be such that (R^j) =  for all j 2 N . Since
 2 ox(Ri); and fx is a median voter scheme, fx(Ri; R^ i) = : Similarly, let
R 2 Un be such that ( Rj) =  for all j 2 N: Since  2 ox(Ri); fx(Ri; R i) = :
Since fx(Ri; R^ i) = Pi = fx(Ri; R i); by the denition of fx, there must exist
S  Nnfig and j0 =2 S such that
fx(Ri; R^j0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g)Pifx(Ri; Rj0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g): (11)
Now, let R0i 2 U be such that (R0i) = fx(Ri; R^j0 ; R^S; R S[fi;jg): Since (R^j) =  <
 = ( Rj0) for all j 2 N;
(R^j0) = 
 = fx(Ri; R^ i)  fx(Ri; R^j0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g)






Then, by (12) and the denition of fx;
fx(R0i; Rj0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g) = f
x(Ri; R^j0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g):
Hence, by (11),
fx(R0i; Rj0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g)Pif
x(Ri; Rj0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g):
Thus, fx is manipulable by i at Ri with any R0i with the property that (R
0
i) =
fx(Ri; R^j0 ; R^S; R S[fi;jg).
Case 2: Suppose  =2 ox(Ri) and there exists  2 ox(Ri) such that  <  <
(Ri) and Pi; the other case where (Ri) <  <  and Pi proceeds similarly
and it is therefore omitted. Let R 2 Un be such that ( Rj) =  for all j 2 N: Since
 2 ox(Ri);
fx(Ri; R i) = : (13)
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Let R^ 2 Un be such that (R^j) =  for all j 2 N: If there exist S  Nnfig and j0 =2 S
such that
fx(Ri; R^j0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g)Pifx(Ri; Rj0 ; R^S; R S[fi;j0g) (14)
holds, the proof proceeds as in Case 1. Hence, assume that there do not exist S 
Nnfig and j0 =2 S satisfying (14). Let Nnfig = fj1; :::; jn 1g: Then,
 = fx(Ri; R i) by (13)
Rif
x(Ri; R^j1 ; R fi;j1g) consider S1 = ;,
j0 = j1 =2 S1; and :(14)
Rif
x(Ri; R^j2 ; R^j1 ; R fj1g[fi;j2g) consider S2 = fj1g,
j0 = j2 =2 S2; and :(14)
Rif
x(Ri; R^j3 ; R^fj1;j2g; R fj1;j2g[fi;j3g) consider S3 = fj1; j2g,




x(Ri; R^jn 2 ; R^fj1;j2;:::;jn 3g; R fj1;j2;:::;jn 3g[fi;jn 2g) consider Sn 1 = fj1; j2; :::; jn 3g,
j0 = jn 2 =2 Sn 1; and :(14)
Rif
x(Ri; R^jn 1 ; R^fj1;j2;:::;jn 2g; R fj1;j2;:::;jn 2g[fi;jn 1g) consider Sn = fj1; j2; :::; jn 2g,
j0 = jn 1 =2 Sn; and :(14)
= fx(Ri; R^ i) fj1; j2; :::; jn 2g [ fi; jn 1g = N:
Hence, as Pi;
Pifx(Ri; R^ i): (15)
Since  2 rfx, fx(R^i; R^ i) = : Thus, by (15), fx(R^i; R^ i)Pifx(Ri; R^ i); which
means that fx is manipulable by i at Ri with any R^i such that (R^i) = .
Case 3: Suppose  =2 ox(Ri) and there exists  2 ox(Ri) such that  <  <
(Ri) and Pi; the other case where (Ri) <  <  and Pi proceeds similarly
and it is therefore omitted. We will prove that this case is not possible. Consider the
prole R^ such that (R^j) =  for all j 2 N: Since  =2 ox(Ri),  2 ox(Ri) and ox(Ri)
is an interval (see Lemma 2), f(Ri; R^ i) < : Furthermore, and since   (Ri);
fx(R^i; R^ i)  fx(Ri; R^ i) < : Hence, fx(R^) < : Thus,  =2 rfx which contradicts
the initial hypothesis.




Consider the case (R0i) < (Ri); the other case is similar and therefore it is omitted:
We distinguish among three di¤erent cases.
Case 1: (Ri) < fx(Ri; R i): Since fx is a median voter scheme and (R0i) <
(Ri), fx(R0i; R i) = f
x(Ri; R i): But this contradicts (16).
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Case 2: (Ri) = fx(Ri; R i): Then, fx(Ri; R i)Pifx(R0i; R i) which also contra-
dicts (16).
Case 3: fx(Ri; R i) < (Ri): Since (P 0i ) < (Ri) and (16), f
x(R0i; R i) <
fx(Ri; R i):Hence, fx(R0i; R i) < f
x(Ri; R i) < (Ri) and (Ri)Pifx(R0i; R i)Pif
x(Ri; R i):
Thus, and since fx(Ri; R i); (Ri) 2 ox(Ri) [ f(Ri)g and fx(R0i; R i) 2 rfx, Ri is
not single-peaked on ox(Ri) [ f(Ri); fx(R0i; R i)g: 
Proof of Lemma 2 We divide the proof into three cases.
Case 1: Suppose (Ri) < x1: The case xn+1 < (Ri) is symmetric and its proof
proceeds similarly; therefore, it is omitted. We prove that ox(Ri) = [x1; xn]: Let
 2 ox(Ri) be arbitrary. Then, there exists R i 2 Un 1 such that
medf(R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1g = :
Redene y = (y1; :::; y2n+1)  ((R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]2n+1: If ys < x1;
and since (Ri) < x1  ::::  xn+1; #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n+ 1g j ys  ysg  n+ 2: Hence,
 6= ys : If xn < ys ; and since (Ri) < x1  x2  ::::  xn; #fs 2 f1; :::2n + 1g j
ys  ysg  n + 2: Hence,  6= ys : Thus,  2 [x1; xn]: Now, let  2 [x1; xn],
R^i = Ri and for all j 2 Nnfig let R^j 2 U be such that (R^j) = . Redene
y = (y1; :::; y2n+1)  ((R^1); :::; (R^n); x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]2n+1: Since   xn  xn+1;
#fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g  n + 1: Furthermore, and since (Ri) < x1  ;
#fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g  n + 1: Hence, #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g =
#fs 2 f1; :::; 2n+1g j ys  g = n+1: Thus, medf(R^1); :::; (R^n); x1; :::; xn+1) = .
Since R^i = Ri,  2 ox(Ri): Therefore, ox(Ri) = [x1; xn]:
Case 2: Suppose x1  (Ri) < x2: The case xn < (Ri)  xn+1 is symmetric
and its proof proceeds similarly; therefore, it is omitted. We prove that ox(Ri) =
[(Ri); xn+1]: Let  2 ox(Ri) be arbitrary. Then, there exists R i 2 Un 1 such that
medf(R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1g = :
Redene y = (y1; :::; y2n+1) = ((R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]2n+1: If ys <
(Ri); and since (Ri) < x2  ::::  xn+1; #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  ysg  n + 2:
Hence,  6= ys : If xn < ys ; and since (Ri) < x2  ::::  xn+1; #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n+1g j
ys  ysg  n + 2: Hence,  6= ys : Thus,  2 [(Ri); xn]: Now, let  2 [(Ri); xn];
R^i = Ri and for all j 2 Nnfig let R^j 2 U be such that (R^j) = . Redene
y = (y1; :::; y2n+1)  ((R^1); :::; (R^n); x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]2n+1: Since   xn  xn+1;
#fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g  n + 1: Furthermore, and since x1  (Ri)  ;
#fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g  n + 1: Hence, #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g =
#fs 2 f1; :::; 2n+1g j ys  g = n+1: Thus, medf(R^1); :::; (R^n); x1; :::; xn+1) = .
Since R^i = Ri;  2 ox(Ri): Therefore, ox(Ri) = [(Ri); xn]:
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Case 3: Suppose x2  (Ri)  xn:We prove that ox(Ri) = [x2; xn]: Let  2 ox(Ri)
be arbitrary. Then, there exists R i 2 Un 1 such that
medf(R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1g = :
Redene y = (y1; :::; y2n+1) = ((R1); :::; (Rn); x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]2n+1: If ys < x2;
and since x2  ::::  xn+1 and x2  (Ri), we have that #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys 
ysg  n+2: Hence,  6= ys : If xn < ys ; and since x1  ::::  xn and (Ri)  xn, we
have that #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n+1g j ys  ysg  n+2: Hence,  6= ys : Thus,  2 [x2; xn]:
Now, let  2 [x2; xn]; R^i = Ri and for all j 2 Nnfig let R^j 2 U be such that (R^j) =
. Redene y = (y1; :::; y2n+1)  ((R^1); :::; (R^n); x1; :::; xn+1) 2 [a; b]2n+1: Since  
xn  xn+1; #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n+1g j ys  g  n+1: Furthermore, and since x1  x2 
; #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g  n + 1: Hence, #fs 2 f1; :::; 2n + 1g j ys  g =
#fs 2 f1; :::; 2n+1g j ys  g = n+1: Thus, medf(R^1); :::; (R^n); x1; :::; xn+1) = .
Since R^i = Ri;  2 ox(Ri): Therefore, ox(Ri) = [x2; xn]. 
Proof of Lemma 3 We divide the proof into ve cases.
Case 1: Suppose (Ri) < x1: Then, by Lemma 2, ox(Ri) = [x1; xn]. Since (Ri) <
x1  xn  yn,
oy(Ri) =
8><>:
[y1; yn] if (Ri) < y1
[(Ri); yn] if y1  (Ri) < y2
[y2; yn] if y2  (Ri)  yn:
Hence, ox(Ri)  oy(Ri):
Case 2: Suppose x1  (Ri) < x2: Then, by Lemma 2, ox(Ri) = [(Ri); xn]. Since
y1  x1  (Ri) < x2  xn  yn,
oy(Ri) =
(
[(Ri); yn] if y1  (Ri) < y2
[y2; yn] if y2  (Ri)  yn:
Hence, ox(Ri)  oy(Ri):
Case 3: Suppose x2  (Ri)  xn: Then, y2  (Ri)  yn: By Lemma 2,
ox(Ri) = [x2; xn] and oy(Ri) = [y2; yn]: Hence, ox(Ri)  oy(Ri):
Case 4: Suppose xn < (Ri)  xn+1: Then, by Lemma 2, ox(Ri) = [x2; (Ri)].
Since y2  x2  xn < (Ri)  xn+1  yn+1,
oy(Ri) =
(
[y2; yn] if y2  (Ri)  yn
[y2; (Ri)] if yn < (Ri)  yn+1:
Hence, ox(Ri)  oy(Ri):
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Case 5: Suppose xn+1 < (Ri): Then, by Lemma 2, ox(Ri) = [x2; xn+1]. Since
y2  x2  xn+1 < (Ri),
oy(Ri) =
8><>:
[y2; yn] if y2  (Ri)  yn
[y2; (Ri)] if yn < (Ri)  yn+1
[y2; yn+1] if yn+1 < (Ri):
Hence, ox(Ri)  oy(Ri): 
7 Appendix 2
We start with two preliminary notions and several remarks.
First, a generalized median voter scheme fp : Un ! [a; b] can alternatively be
represented by a monotonic family of right xed ballots pr = fprSgS22N , where (i) for
all S 2 2N , prS 2 [a; b]; (ii) S  T implies prS  prT ; (iii) for all S 2 2N ; prS = pNnS,
and (iv) for all R 2 Un; fp(R) = maxS22N minj2Sf(Rj); prSg  fpr(R):
Second, a non-dummy interval Ii is a maximal non-dummy interval for i if there
is no non-dummy interval I 0i such that Ii ( I 0i. Since the number of coalitions that
contain a player is nite, any maximal non-dummy interval Ii can be written as the
union of a family of intervals; namely, Ii = [Kk=1ISki , where i 2 Sk for all k = 1; :::; K:
Before moving to the proof of the four lemmata used to prove Theorem 2, we state
without proof the following facts.
Remark 2 Let fp : Un ! [a; b] be a generalized median voter scheme and let Ri 2 U .
Then, Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri)\Ii)[f(Ri); g for all  2 Ii, for all maximal
non-dummy interval Ii if and only if Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri)\ISi )[f(Ri); g
for all  2 ISi ; for all non-dummy interval ISi .
Remark 3 If pfig < pf;g; then [pfig; pf;g] is a non-dummy interval for i in fp : Un !
[a; b]: If pN < pNnfig; then [pN ; pNnfig] is a non-dummy interval for i in fp.
Remark 4 If  2 [pN ; pNnfig],  2 [pfig; pf;g] and Ii is a maximal non-dummy inter-
val for i in fp : Un ! [a; b] such that ;  2 Ii; then Ii = [pN ; pf;g]:
Remark 5 If pfig < pNnfig; then [pN ; pf;g] is a (maximal) non-dummy interval for i
in fp : Un ! [a; b]:
Remark 6 If pN = pfig < pNnfig = pf;g; then i is a dictator in fp : Un ! [a; b]:
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Proof of Lemma 4 Let fp : Un ! [a; b] be a generalized median voter scheme.
We will denote fp simply by f:
)) Assume i is non-dummy at  in f: Then, there exist R 2 Un and R0i 2 U such
that f(Ri; R i) =  and f(R0i; R i) 6= : We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 : Assume f(Ri; R i) =  < f(R0i; R i): Since f is a generalized me-
dian voter scheme, (Ri)   < (R0i). Let S = fj 2 N j (Rj)  g. Ob-
serve that i 2 S: First, we prove that pS  : Suppose otherwise,  < pS; then,
maxj2Sf(Rj); pSg = pS > : By the denition of S and f; f(Ri; R i) > ; a con-
tradiction with f(Ri; R i) = : Now, we prove that  < pSnfig: Suppose otherwise,
pSnfig  : For all j 2 Snfig; (R0j) = (Rj)  : Hence, maxj2Snfigf(R0j); pSnfigg 
 . Thus, f(R0i; R i)  , a contradiction with f(R0i; R i) > . Therefore, pS   
pSnfig: Since f(Ri; R i) < f(R0i; R i); pS < pSnfig:
Case 2 : Assume f(R0i; R i) <  = f(Ri; R i): The proof proceeds symmetrically
to Case 1 using the right phantom representation of f:
() Assume there exists S  N such that i 2 S, pS < pSnfig and pS    pSnfig.
We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 : Assume pS   < pSnfig. Let R 2 Un be such that (Rj) =  for all
j 2 S and (Rj) = b for all j =2 S: Then, f(R) = . Let R0i 2 U be such that
 < (R0i) < pSnfig: Hence, f(R
0
i; R i) = (R
0
i) 6= : Thus, i is non-dummy at  in f:
Case 2 : Assume pS <   pSnfig: Let R 2 Un be such that (Rj) = pS for all
j 2 Snfig; (Ri) =  and (Rj) = b for all j =2 S: Then, f(R) = : Let R0i 2 U be
such that pS < (R0i) < : Hence, f(R
0
i; R i) = (R
0
i) 6= : Thus, i is non-dummy at
 in f: 
Proof of Lemma 5 We will denote fp and op(Ri) simply by f and o(Ri); respec-
tively.
)) Assume f is not manipulable by i at Ri and let ISi = [pS; pSnfig] be a non
dummy interval for i in f: Fix  2 ISi and let  2 (o(Ri) \ ISi ) [ f(Ri)g: We
distinguish among four cases.
Case 1 : Assume  2 (o(Ri) \ ISi ) [ f(Ri)g and  <   (Ri) (if  <  the
proof is similar changing the role of  and ):We will show that Ri: If  = (Ri)
the statement holds immediately. Assume  < (Ri): Then, ;  2 ISi . Hence, and
since  < , pS   < pSnfig. Consider any R i 2 Un 1 with the property that for
every j 2 Nnfig;
(Rj) =
(
 if j 2 Snfig
 if j 2 NnS: (17)
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Let R 2 Un be such that ( Rj) =  for all j 2 Nnfig and ( Ri) = (Ri). Since
 2 o(Ri) = o( Ri); f( R) = : As (Rj)  ( Rj) for j 2 N; by Remark 1, f(R) 
f( R) =  . Moreover,   f(R). Hence,
  f(R)  :
If S 0  Snfig; then  < pSnfig  pS0 because p is monotonic. Hence,max
j2S0
f(Rj); pS0g >
: If S 0 " Snfig; then max
j2S0
f(Rj); pS0g   > : Thus,  < f(R)  :We proceed
by distinguishing between two subcases.
Subcase 1.1 : Assume f(R) = : Consider any R^i 2 U such that (R^i) = : Since
 < f(R);   f(R^i; R i). Furthermore, since pS   = (R^i) and (Rj) =  for
all j 2 Snfig; f(R^i; R i)  . Hence, f(R^i; R i) = : Since f is not manipulable
by i at Ri, Ri holds.
Subcase 1.2 : Assume f(R) < : Then, f(R) =2 f; ; (Ri)g = f(Rj) j j 2 Ng:
Thus, f(R) 2 fpS j S  Ng. Set R1  R and 1  f(R1): Observe that  < 1 < 
and since f is not manipulable by i at Ri; 1 = f(R
1)Ri
 (because f(R^i; R1 i) = 

if (R^i) = ). Since fpS j S  Ng is nite, we apply successively the previous
argument starting with 1 <  and obtaining R
1; R2; :::; RK where (i) K  2n, (ii)
Rki = Ri for all k = 1; :::; K, (iii) 
 < f(Rk) < f(Rk+1) <  for all k = 1; :::; K   1,
(iv) f(R1)Ri and f(Rk)Rif(Rk 1) for all k = 1; :::; K, (v) f(Rk) 2 fpS j S  Ng
and (vi) f(RK) = : Then, by transitivity of Ri; Ri:
Case 2 : Assume  2 (o(Ri) \ ISi ) [ f(Ri)g and (Ri)   < : The proof
proceeds as in Case 1 using the right phantom representation of f:
Case 3 : Assume  =2 o(Ri) and  <   (Ri) (if (Ri)   <  the proof
is similar using the right phantom representation of f). We will show that Ri:
If  = (Ri) the statement holds immediately. Assume  < (Ri) and consider any
prole R 2 Un where, for every j 2 N; ( Rj) = : Since  2 ISi  rf , f( R) = .
We will show that   f(Ri; R i)  : Let R^ = (Ri; R i): Since   (R^j) for all
j 2 N;   f(R^): Consider any subprole ~R i 2 Un 1 where, for every j 2 Nnfig;
( ~Rj) = : Since  2 o(Ri); f(Ri; ~R i) = : As ( Rj) =  <  = ( ~Rj) for all
j 2 Nnfig; by Remark 1, f(Ri; R i)  . Since f is not manipulable by i at Ri and
f(Ri; R i) 6=  (because  =2 o(Ri)) we have that f(Ri; R i)Rif( R) = : Dene
0 = f(Ri; R i): Notice that 0    (Ri) and 0 2 o(Ri) \ ISi : Therefore, by Case
1, Ri0. By transitivity of Ri, Ri:
Case 4 : Assume  =2 o(Ri) and  <   (Ri): (if (Ri)   <  the proof
is similar changing the role of  by ). We will show that this case is not possible.
Consider any prole R0 2 Un such that (R0j) =  for all j 2 N: Since  =2 o(Ri),
 2 o(Ri) and o(Ri) is an interval, f(Ri; R0 i) < : Furthermore, as   (Ri) and
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Remark 1 holds, f(R0i; R
0
 i)  f(Ri; R0 i) < : Hence, f(R0) < : Thus,  =2 rf
which contradicts the fact that  2 ISi :
() Assume f is manipulable by i at Ri: Then there exist R0i 2 U and R i 2 Un 1
such that
f(R0i; R i)Pif(Ri; R i): (18)
We assume that (R0i) < (Ri) (if (Ri) < (R
0
i) the proof is similar using the right
phantom representation of f). Set R0 = (R0i; R i):We distinguish among three cases.
Case 1: Assume (Ri) < f(R): Since f is a generalized median voter scheme and
(R0i) < (Ri), f(R
0) = f(R), which contradicts (18).
Case 2: Assume (Ri) = f(R): Then f(R)Rif(R0); which also contradicts (18).
Case 3: Assume f(R) < (Ri): Since (R0i) < (Ri); by Remark 1, f(R
0)  f(R)
and (18), f(R0) < f(R) holds. Hence, f(R0) < f(R) < (Ri) and (Ri)Pif(R0)Pif(R):
Thus, as f(R); (Ri) 2 o(Ri)[f(Ri)g; Ri is not single-peaked on o(Ri)[f(Ri); f(R0)g:
We will show that there exists S  N such that i 2 S and f(R0); f(R) 2 ISi =
[pS; pSnfig]: Set   f(R0) < f(R)  : Since f(R0) < f(R) and f is a generalized
median voter scheme, (R0i)  f(R0) =  Dene S = fj 2 N j (Rj)  g: Then,
i =2 S and because  = f(R);
p S  : (19)
Set, S  S [ fig: Hence, S = fj 2 N j (R0j)  g: Suppose pS > : Then, for all
S 0  S maxj2S0f(R0j); pS0g  pS0  pS >  and for all S * S;maxj2Sf(R0j); pSg >
 because if j =2 S; then (R0j) > : Thus,  < f(R0), which is a contradiction.
Hence pS  . Therefore, i 2 S and
pS   <   pSnfig;
since Snfig = S and (19) hold. Thus, there exist a non dummy interval [pS; pSnfig]
and  = f(R0) 2 [pS; pSnfig] such that Ri is not single-peaked on (o(Ri)\[pS; pSnfig])[
f(Ri); g. 
Proof of Lemma 6 The proof is omitted since it consists of verifying that the
option set can be written as stated. 
Proof of Lemma 7 Let i 2 S  N , ISi a non-dummy interval for i in fp and
 2 ISi be arbitrary. The proof proceeds by looking at di¤erent cases that can
be grouped into two main cases depending on whether pNnfig  pfig (Case 1) or
pfig < pNnfig (Case 2).
Case 1 : Assume pNnfig  pfig: Since [pN ; pfig] [ [pNnfig; pf;g] = rf and ISi 
NDip  rf , either  2 [pN ; pfig] \ NDip or  2 [pNnfig; pf;g] \ NDip: Hence, by (7)
and (8), either  2 [pN ; pfig] \NDip or  2 [pNnfig; pf;g] \NDip: Thus, there exists
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a non-dummy interval Ii for i in f p such that  2 Ii: Let I^i be a maximal non-
dummy interval for i in f p such that Ii  I^i: We have that  2 I^i: We will show
that (op(Ri) \ ISi )  (op(Ri) \ I^i) for all Ri 2 U , showing that for all  2 op(Ri) \ ISi
two things happen simultaneously:  2 I^i (Claim a) and  2 op(Ri) (Claim A), for
all Ri 2 U .
Claim a:  2 I^i.
Proof of Claim a: We distinguish among ve cases.
Case a.1 :  2 [pN ; pfig]n[pNnfig; p;] and pN    pfig: Assume    (the proof
of the other case proceeds similarly). As ;  2 [pN ; pfig] \ ISi and ISi is a interval,
[; ]  [pN ; pfig] \ ISi : Hence, by (7), [; ]  [pN ; pfig] \NDip  [pN ; pfig] \NDip:
Then, [; ]  NDip. As I^i is a maximal non-dummy interval and  2 I^i, [; ] 
I^i: Therefore,  2 I^i:
Case a.2 :  2 [pN ; pfig]n[pNnfig; pf;g] and pfig <   pf;g. As pN   < pNnfig;
pfig <   pf;g and ISi is a non-dummy interval such that ;  2 ISi , we have that
by Remark 4, NDip = [pN ; pf;g]. Then, by (7) and (8), [pN ; pfig]  [pN ; pfig] \ NDip
and [pNnfig; pf;g]  [pNnfig; pf;g]\NDip: Hence, [pN ; pfig][ [pNnfig; pf;g]  NDip. Thus,
[; ]  NDip: As I^i is a maximal non-dummy interval and  2 I^i, [; ]  I^i:
Therefore,  2 I^i:
Case a.3 :  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]n[pN ; pfig] and pNnfig    pf;g: Assume  < 
(the proof of the other case proceeds similarly). Since ;  2 [pNnfig; pf;g] \ ISi
and ISi is an interval, by (8), [
; ]  [pNnfig; pf;g] \ ISi  [pNnfig; pf;g] \ NDip 
[pNnfig; pf;g] \ NDip: Hence, [; ]  NDip: As I^i is a maximal non-dummy interval
and  2 I^i, [; ]  I^i: Therefore,  2 I^i:
Case a.4 :  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]n[pN ; pfig] and pN   < pNnfig. Since pfig <  
pf;g; pN   < pNnfig and ISi is a non-dummy interval such that ;  2 ISi , by
Remark 4, NDip = [pN ; pf;g]. Hence, by (7) and (8) [pN ; pfig]  [pN ; pfig] \ NDip
and [pNnfig; pf;g]  [pNnfig; pf;g] \ NDip: Hence, [pN ; pfig] [ [pNnfig; pf;g]  NDip and
[; ]  NDip: As I^i is a maximal non-dummy interval and  2 I^i, [; ]  I^i:
Therefore,  2 I^i:
Case a.5 :  2 [pNnfig; pf;g] \ [pN ; pfig]: Hence,  2 [pNnfig; pfig] \ NDip: Thus,
by (7) and (8),  2 [pNnfig; pf;g] \ [pN ; pfig] \ NDip. Assume  <  (the proof
of the other case proceeds similarly). Since pNnfig <  <   pf;g; and ISi is a
an interval, [; ]  [pNnfig; pf;g] \ ISi . Hence, by (8), [; ]  [pNnfig; pf;g] \NDip:
Thus [; ]  NDip: As I^i is a maximal non-dummy interval and  2 I^i, [; ]  I^i:
Therefore,  2 I^i:
Claim A:  2 op(Ri):
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Proof of Claim A: We proceed by rst distinguishing between Case A.1 and Case A.2,
and in turn for each one of them, the proof is divided in 5 subcases.
Case A.1 : pNnfig  pfig: By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; pfig] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pfig < (Ri)  pf;g




[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; pfig] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pfig < (Ri)  pf;g
[pNnfig; pf;g] if pf;g < (Ri):
(20)
Case A.1.1 : a  (Ri)  pN : Then,  2 [pN ; pfig]: Since  2 ISi ;  2 [pN ; pfig] \
NDip: By (7),  2 [pN ; pfig]: Then,  2 [(Ri); pfig] and pN  : Therefore, by the
rst three rows in (20),  2 op(Ri) holds:
Case A.1.2 : pN < (Ri)  pNnfig: Then,  2 [(Ri); pfig]: Since  2 ISi ;  2
[pN ; pfig]\NDip. By (7),  2 [pN ; pfig]: Then,  2 [(Ri); pfig] and pN  : Therefore,
by the rst three rows in (20),  2 op(Ri) holds:
Case A.1.3 : pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig: Then,  2 [pNnfig; pfig]: Since  2 ISi ;  2
[pNnfig; pfig] \NDip. By (7) and (8);  2 [pNnfig; pfig]: By (20),  2 op(Ri):
Case A.1.4 : pfig < (Ri)  pf;g: Then,  2 [pNnfig; (Ri)]: Since  2 ISi ;  2
[pNnfig; pf;g] \ NDip: By (8),  2 [pNnfig; p;]: Then,  2 [pNnfig; (Ri)] and   pf;g:
Therefore, by the last three rows in (20),  2 op(Ri) holds:
Case A.1.5 : pf;g < (Ri): Then,  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]: Since  2 ISi ;  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]\
NDip: By (8),  2 [pNnfig; p;]: Then,  2 [pNnfig; (Ri)] and   pf;g: Therefore, by
the last three rows in (20),  2 op(Ri) holds:
Case A.2 : pfig < pNnfig: By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pfig
f(Ri)g if pfig < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pf;g
[pNnfig; pf;g] if pf;g < (Ri):
(21)
Case A.2.1 : a  (Ri)  pN : The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.1.
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Case A.2.2 : pN < (Ri)  pNnfig: The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.2.
Case A.2.3 : pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig: Then,  2 [pNnfig; pfig]: By (7), (8) and
 2 NDip;  2 [pNnfig; pfig] \ NDip; contradicting that pfig < pNnfig: Then, in this
case, ISi \ op(Ri) = ; and the proof is trivial.
Case A.2.4 : pfig < (Ri)  pf;g: The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.4.
Case A.2.5 : pf;g < (Ri): The proof proceeds as in Case A.1.5.
Case 2 : Assume pfig < pNnfig: Then, by Remark 5, NDip = [pN ; pf;g] and itself is
a maximal non-dummy interval for i in fp. As [pN ; pf;g] = [pN ; pfig] [ [pfig; pNnfig] [
[pNnfig; pf;g]; by (7), (8) and (9), we have that there exists a non-dummy interval for
i in f p such that [pN ; pf;g]  I^i. Let  2 [pN ; pf;g] be arbitrary. Then,  2 I^i: We
will show that
(op(Ri) \ [pN ; pf;g])  (op(Ri) \ I^i) for all Ri 2 U : (22)
Then, and since ISi  [pN ; pf;g] for any S  N; the statement of Lemma 7 will follow
immediately since (op(Ri) \ ISi )  (op(Ri) \ [pN ; pf;g])  (op(Ri) \ I^i): To prove that
(22) holds observe rst that op(Ri) \ [pN ; pf;g]  I^i. It remains to be proven that if
 2 op(Ri) \ [pN ; pf;g]; then  2 op(Ri). We proceed by distinguishing between two
cases.
Case 2.1 : pNnfig  pfig: By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pfig
f(Ri)g if pfig < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pf;g





[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; pfig] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pfig < (Ri)  pf;g
[pNnfig; pf;g] if pf;g < (Ri):
(24)
We distinguish among ve subcases.
Case 2.1.1 : a  (Ri)  pN : Then  2 [pN ; pfig]: Since  2 ISi ;  2 [pN ; pfig] \
NDip. By (7),  2 [pN ; pfig]: Then,  2 [(Ri); pfig] and pN  : Therefore, by the
rst three rows in (24),  2 op(Ri) holds:
Case 2.1.2 : pN < (Ri)  pfig: Then,  2 [(Ri); pfig]: Since  2 ISi ;  2
[pN ; pfig]\NDip. By (7),  2 [pN ; pfig]: Then,  2 [(Ri); pfig] and pN  : Therefore,
by the rst three rows in (24),  2 op(Ri) holds:
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Case 2.1.3 : pfig < (Ri)  pNnfig: Then,  = (Ri) 2 [pN ; pf;g]  I^i  [pN ; pf;g]:
Since  = (Ri) 2 [pN ; p;];  2 op(Ri) because f p in unanimous on rf p = [pN ; p;]:
Case 2.1.4 : pNnfig < (Ri)  pf;g: Then,  2 [pNnfig; (Ri)]: Since  2 ISi ;
 2 [pNnfig; p;] \ NDip. By (8),  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]: Then,  2 [pNnfig; (Ri)] and
  pf;g: Therefore, by the last three rows in (24),  2 op(Ri) holds:
Case 2.1.5 : pf;g < (Ri): Then,  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]: Since  2 ISi ;  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]\
NDip. By (8),  2 [pNnfig; pf;g]: Then,  2 [pNnfig; (Ri)] and   pf;g: Therefore, by
the last three rows in (24),  2 op(Ri) holds:
Case 2.2 : pfig < pNnfig: By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
[pN ; pfig] if a  (Ri)  pN
[(Ri); pfig] if pN < (Ri)  pfig
f(Ri)g if pfig < (Ri)  pNnfig
[pNnfig; (Ri)] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pf;g
[pNnfig; pf;g] if pf;g < (Ri):
(25)
The proof follows similar arguments to the ones already used in Case 2.1. 
Proof of Theorem 2
)) Suppose Ri 2 Mfpi : By Lemma 5, there exist a non-dummy interval ISi =
[pS; pSnfig] for i in fp and  2 ISi such that Ri is not single-peaked on (op(Ri)\ ISi )[
f(Ri); g: Hence, by Lemma 7, there exists a maximal non-dummy interval I^i for i
in f p such that  2 I^i and (op(Ri) \ ISi ) [ f(Ri); g  (op(Ri) \ I^i) [ f(Ri); g:
Thus, Ri is not single-peaked on (op(Ri) \ I^i) [ f(Ri); g: Then by Lemma 5 and
Remark 2, Ri 2Mf pi .
() Assume f p is at least as manipulable as fp: Then,
Mfpi Mf
p
i for all i 2 N: (26)
To obtain a contradiction assume [pN ; pfig]\NDip * [pN ; pfig]\NDip or [pNnfig; pf;g]\
NDip * [pNnfig; pf;g] \ NDip or [pfig; pNnfig] * NDip: We proceed by distinguishing
among the three cases.
Case 1 : [pN ; pfig] \ NDip * [pN ; pfig] \ NDip: Then, there exists a maximal non-
dummy interval I for i in fp such that [pN ; pfig] \ I * [pN ; pfig] \NDip: Let 1  2
be such that [pN ; pfig] \ I = [1; 2]. Let fI itgt=1;:::;T be the collection of all maximal
non-dummy intervals for i in f p; in particular, by the denition of NDip and the fact
that they are maximal intervals, NDip =
S
t=1;:::;T
I it and for all t; t
0 = 1; :::; T such
that t 6= t0; I it \ I it0 = ;: Then, for any maximal non-dummy interval I it for i in fp we
have that
[1; 2] * [pN ; pfig] \ I it : (27)
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We distinguish between two subcases.
Case 1.a: NDip = ;: Two further subcases are possible.
Case 1.a.1 : 1 < 2. Let ; ;  2 [a; b] and Ri 2 U be such that 1 <  <  <
 < 2, (Ri) = , and Pi:10 Hence, (Ri) 2 [1; 2]  [pN ; pfig]: By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) =
(
[pNnfig; pfig] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig
[(Ri); pfig] otherwise.
Then, and because ;  2 [1; 2]  I and ;  2 [(Ri); 2]  [(Ri); pfig]  op(Ri);
Ri is not single-peaked on (op(Ri)\I)[f(Ri)g since Pi. But for all t = 1; :::; T and
all 0 2 I it ; Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri)\ I it)[f(Ri); 0g trivially since op(Ri)\ I it =
;: Thus, by Lemma 5, Ri 2Mfpi nMf
p
i which contradicts (26).
Case 1.a.2 : 1 = 2: Since I  [pN ; pf;g], [pN ; pfig] \ I = f1g and I is a (non
degenerated) interval (since I is a non-dummy interval), pfig = 1 = 2. Therefore,
I = [pfig; pf;g] because I  [pN ; pf;g], I is a maximal non-dummy interval and by
Remark 3, [pfig; pf;g] is a non-dummy interval of i in fp. Hence, as I is a non
degenerated interval,
pfig = 1 < pf;g:
Two subcases are possible.
Case 1.a.2.a: pNnfig < pf;g. Let ; ;  2 [a; b] andRi 2 U be such thatmaxfpNnfig; pfigg <
 <  <  < pf;g, (Ri) = , and Pi.11 Hence, (Ri) 2 [maxfpNnfig; pfigg; pf;g]:
By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) = [pNnfig; (Ri)]:
Then, and because ; ; (Ri) 2 op(Ri) \ I [ f(Ri)g; Ri is not single-peaked on
op(Ri) \ I [ f(Ri)g since Pi. But for t = 1; :::; T and all  2 I it ; Ri is single-
peaked on (op(Ri)\ I it)[ f(Ri); 0g trivially since op(Ri)\ I it = ;. Thus, by Lemma
5, Ri 2Mfpi nMf
p
i which contradicts (26).
Case 1.a.2.b: pfig < pNnfig = pf;g: Then, by Remark 5, [pN ; pf;g] is a non-dummy
interval of i in fp. As I = [pfig; pf;g] is a maximal non-dummy interval of i in fp; we
must have I = [pN ; pf;g]: Therefore, pN = pfig: Hence, pN = pfig and pNnfig = pf;g:
By Remark 6, i is a dictator in fp, which is a contradiction.
Case 1.b: NDip 6= ;: Then, [pN ; pfig] \ I it 6= ; for all t = 1; :::; T . To see that,
observe that it holds immediately if pfig = pf;g: Assume pfig < pf;g: Then, there exists
I it0  Ifigi = [pfig; pf;g] because, by Remark 3, [pfig; pf;g] is a non-dummy interval for
i in f p: Then, [pN ; pfig] \ I it0 6= ;: Furthermore, for all t 6= t0; [pN ; pfig] \ I it 6= ;; since
10Ri is dened in any arbitrary way in [a; b]nf; g.
11Ri is dened in any arbitrary way in [a; b]nf; g.
38
I it \ I t0i = ;: For each t = 1; :::; T; let t1  t2 be such that [pN ; pfig] \ I it = [t1; t2].
Then, by (27), [1; 2] * [t1; t2] for all t = 1; :::; T: Hence,
1 < 
t
1 or 2 > 
t
2 for all t = 1; :::; T: (28)
Assume, without loss of generality, that 11 < 
2






2 < ::: < 
T
2 ):
We distinguish among four di¤erent cases.
Case 1.b.1 : There exists t0 2 f1; :::; Tg such that 1 < t01  2  t02 : This t0 is
unique, because the family fI itgt=1;:::;T is pair-wise disjoint. Let
2 =
(
maxf 2 I it0 1g if t0 6= 1




minf 2 I it0+1g if t0 6= T
b if t0 = T:
Thus, 2 < 
t0
1 (if 2 6= a, then proof is trivial and if 2 = a, then a  1 < t01 ) and
1  t02 : Let Ri 2 U and ; ;  2 [a; b] be such that (i) maxf1; 2g <  <  <
 < t
0
1 , (ii) (Ri) = , (iii) Pi, (iv) if ;  2 [a; b] and t01 <  < ; then t01RiRi;
and (v) if ;  2 [a; b] and  <  < maxf1; 2g; then maxf1; 2gRiRi:12 Hence,
(Ri) 2 (1; 2)  [pN ; pfig] and (Ri) < t01 < pfig; where the last inequality follows
from the fact that [pN ; pfig] \ I it0 = [t01 ; t02 ]: By Lemma 6, and since if pfig < pNnfig









[pN ; pfig] if (Ri) < pN
[pNnfig; pfig] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig
[(Ri); pfig] otherwise.
(29)
Then, Ri is not single-peaked on (op(Ri)\I)[f(Ri)g because ;  2 [1; 2]  I and
;  2 [(Ri); 2]  [(Ri); pfig]  op(Ri). We will now show that, for all t = 1; :::; T ,
Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri)\ I it)[f(Ri); 0g for all 0 2 I it :We distinguish between
two subcases.
Case 1.b.1.a: t 6= t0: By the denition of Ri and the fact that either I it  [pN ; 2] 
[pN ;maxf1; 2g] or I it  [1; pf;g]  [1; pf;g]  [t01 ; pf;g]; Ri is single-peaked on
I it [ f(Ri)g: Thus, Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri) \ I it) [ f(Ri); 0g for all 0 2 I it :




Case 1.b.1.b: t = t0: By (29), op(Ri)  [pN ; pfig]: Hence, op(Ri) \ I it0  [t01 ; t02 ]:
Thus, by its denition, Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri) \ I it0) [ f(Ri)g: Let 0 2 I it0 :
Two further subcases are distinguished.
Case 1.b.1.b.1 : 0 2 [pN ; pfig]: Then, 0 2 [t01 ; t02 ] because 0 2 I it0. Hence, by
the denition of Ri and the fact that op(Ri) \ I it0  [t01 ; t02 ]; Ri is single-peaked on
(op(Ri) \ I it0) [ f(Ri); 0g:
Case 1.b.1.b.2 : 0 =2 [pN ; pfig]: Then, 0 > pfig  t02  t01 : Hence, by the denition
of Ri and the fact that op(Ri) \ I it0  [t01 ; t02 ]; Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri) \ I it0) [
f(Ri); 0g.
Then, by Lemma 5, Ri 2Mfpi nMf
p
i which contradicts (26).
Case 1.b.2 : There exists t0 2 f1; :::; Tg such that t01  1  t02 < 2: This t0 is
unique, because the family fI itgt=1;:::;T is pair-wise disjoint. The proof of this case is
similar to Case 1.b.1, because the problem is symmetric, and therefore it is omitted.
Case 1.b.3 : [1; 2] \ [t1t2] = ; for all t 2 f1; :::; Tg. The proof of this case is
similar to Case 1.a and therefore it is omitted.
Case 1.b.4 : Assume that neither Case 1.b.1 nor Case 1.b.2 nor Case 1.b.3 hold.
By (28), for all t 2 f1; :::; Tg;
t1 > 1 and 
t
2 < 2:
Let 1 = 
1
1 and 2 = 
T
2 : Then,
1 < 1  2 < 2:
Let Ri 2 U and ; ;  2 [a; b] be such that (i) 1 <  <  <  < 1 (ii) (Ri) = ,
(iii) Pi, and (iv) if ;  2 [a; b] and 1 <  < ; then 1RiRi.13 Hence, (Ri) 2









[pN ; pfig] if (Ri) < pN
[pNnfig; pfig] if pNnfig < (Ri)  pfig
[(Ri); pfig] otherwise.
(30)
Then, Ri is not single-peaked on (op(Ri)\ I)[f(Ri)g because ;  2 op(Ri)\ I. We
will now show that, for all t = 1; :::; T , Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri)\ I it)[f(Ri); 0g
13Ri is dened in any arbitrary way in [a; 1]nf; g.
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for all 0 2 I it : Fix t = 1; :::; T: Since op(Ri)  [pN ; pfig], op(Ri)\ I it  [t1; t2]  [1; 2]:
Then, by its denition, Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri)\ I it)[f(Ri)g:We will now show
that Ri is single-peaked on (op(Ri) \ I it) [ f(Ri); 0g for all 0 2 I it : We distinguish
between two subcases.
Case 1.b.4.a: 0 2 [pN ; pfig]: Then, 0 2 [t1; t2] because 0 2 I it . Hence, 0 2
[1; 2]. Therefore, by denition of Ri and the fact that o
p(Ri) \ I it  [1; 2]; Ri is
single-peaked on (op(Ri) \ I it) [ f(Ri); 0g:
Case 1.b.4.b: 0 =2 [pN ; pfig]: Then, 0 > pfig  2  1 because 0 2 I it  rf p).
Hence, by denition of Ri and the fact that op(Ri)\ I it  [1; 2]; Ri is single-peaked
on (op(Ri) \ I it) [ f(Ri); 0g.
Therefore, by Lemma 5, Ri 2Mfpi nMf
p
i which contradicts (26).
Case 2 : [pNnfig; pf;g]\NDip * [pNnfig; pf;g]\NDip: Since the problem is symmetric,
the proof is similar to the one used in Case 1.
Case 3 : [pfig; pNnfig] * NDip: Then pfig  pNnfig: We proceed by distinguishing
among four subcases.
Case 3.a: pfig = pNnfig: Then, we can apply either Case 1 or Case 2.
Hence, assume pfig < pNnfig and let  2 [pfig; pNnfig]nNDip.
Case 3.b: Either pfig =  or pNnfig =  hold. Then, we can apply either Case 1
or Case 2.
Case 3.c: pfig <  < pNnfig and pN < pfig: Let Ri 2 U and ;  2 [a; b] be such
that (i) pN <  <  < pfig, (ii) (Ri) = , (iii) Pi and (iv) if ;  2 [a; b]nfg and
 <  <  or  <  < ; then Ri: By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) = [(Ri); pfig]: (31)
Since pfig < pNnfig, ND
p
i = [pN ; pf;g] holds. As Ri is not single-peaked on (o
p(Ri) \
[pN ; pf;g]) [ f(Ri); g and  2 [pN ; pf;g] = NDpi ; by Lemma 5, Ri 2 Mf
p
i : Further-
more, as Ri is single-peaked on [a; b]nfg and  =2 NDip, by Lemma 5, Ri =2 Mf
p
i :
Thus, Ri 2Mfpi nMf
p
i which contradicts (26).
Case 3d : pfig <  < pNnfig and pN = pfig: Then, pNnfig < pf;g (otherwise i is a
dictator). Let Ri 2 U and ;  2 [a; b] be such that (i) pNnfig <  <  < pf;g, (ii)
(Ri) = , (iii) Pi and (iv) if ;  2 [a; b]nfg and  <  <  or  <  < ; then
Ri: By Lemma 6,
op(Ri) = [pNnfig; (Ri)]: (32)
Since pfig < pNnfig, ND
p
i = [pN ; pf;g] holds. As Ri is not single-peaked on (o
p(Ri) \




more, as Ri is single-peaked on [a; b]nfg and  =2 NDip, by Lemma 5, Ri =2 Mf
p
i :
Thus, Ri 2Mfpi nMf
p
i which contradicts (26). 
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